Software-defined networking (SDN) decouples the control and data planes of traditional networks, logically centralizing the functional properties of the network in the SDN controller. While this centralization brought advantages such as a faster pace of innovation, it also disrupted some of the natural defenses of traditional architectures against different threats. The literature on SDN has mostly been concerned with the functional side, despite some specific works concerning non-functional properties such as security or dependability. Though addressing the latter in an ad-hoc, piecemeal way may work, it will most likely lead to efficiency and effectiveness problems.
We claim that the coherent enforcement of non-functional properties is a pillar of SDN robustness, but it currently lacks a systemic, top-down approach. As such, in this article, we propose a reiteration of the successful formula behind SDN -logical centralization -for its materialization. We believe that this step is critical to the successful deployment of SDN, especially at infrastructure/ enterprise scale.
In fact, the problematic scenarios exemplified above can be best avoided by the logical centralization of the system-wide enforcement of non-functional properties, increasing the chances that the whole architecture inherits them in a more balanced and coherent way. The steps to achieve such goal are to (a) select the crucial properties to enforce (dependability, security, QoS, etc.); (b) identify the current gaps that stand in the way of achieving such properties in SDNs; (c) design a logically centralized subsystem architecture and middleware, with hooks to the main SDN architectural components, in a way that they can inherit the desired properties; and (d) populate the middleware with the appropriate mechanisms and protocols to enforce the desired properties/ predicates across controllers and devices in a global and consistent manner.
Generically speaking, it is worth emphasizing that centralization has been proposed as a means to address different problems of current networks. For instance, the use of centralized cryptography schemes and centralized sources of trust to authenticate and authorize known entities has been pointed out as a solution for improving the security of Ethernet networks [63] . Similarly, recent research has suggested network security as a service as a means to provide the required security of enterprise networks [110] . However, centralization has its drawbacks; thus, let us explain why centralization of non-functional property enforcement brings important gains to softwaredefined networking. We claim, and justify ahead in the article, that it allows one to define and enforce global policies for those properties, reduce the complexity of networking devices, ensure higher levels of robustness for critical services, foster interoperability of the non-functional enforcement mechanisms, and better promote the resilience of the architecture itself.
To achieve these goals, we propose anchor, a subsystem architecture that does not modify the essence of the current SDN architecture with its payload controllers and devices but rather stands aside, 'anchors' (logically centralizes) crucial functionality and properties, and 'hooks' to the latter components in order to secure the desired properties. The reader will note that this design philosophy concerns any kind of non-functional properties. To prove our point, in this article, we have chosen security as our use case and identified at least four gaps that stand in the way of achieving the former goals in current SDN systems: (i) security-performance gap; (ii) complexity-robustness gap; (iii) global security policies gap; and (iv) resilient roots-of-trust gap. The security-performance gap comes from the frequent conflict between mechanisms enforcing those two properties. The complexity-robustness gap represents the conflict between the current complexity of security and cryptography implementations and the negative impact that this has on robustness and, hence, correctness. The lack of global security policies leads to ad-hoc and discretionary solutions creating weak spots in architectures. The lack of a resilient root-of-trust burdens controllers and devices with trust enforcement mechanisms that are ad hoc, have limited reach and are often suboptimal. We further elaborate in the article on the reasons behind these gaps, their negative effects in SDN architectures, and how they can possibly be mitigated through a logically centralized security enforcement architecture. That is, in this particular case study, the architecture middleware is populated with specific functionality whose main aim is to ensure the 'security' of control plane associations and of communication amongst controllers and devices.
In addition, in this article, we give first steps in addressing a long-standing problem, the fact that a single root-of trust-like anchor, but also like any other standard trusted third party, for example, CAs in X.509 PKI or the KDC in Kerberos-is a single point of failure (SPoF). There is nothing wrong with SPoFs, as long as they fail rarely and/or the consequences of failure can be 8:4 D. Kreutz et al. mitigated, which is unfortunately not the common case. As such, we start by carefully promoting reliability in the design of anchor, endowing it with robust functions in the different modules, in order to reduce the probability of failure/compromise. Moreover, the proposed architecture requires only symmetric key cryptography. This not only ensures a very high performance but also makes the system secure against attacks by a quantum computer. Thus, the system is also postquantum secure [19] . Second, we mitigate the consequences of successful attacks, by protecting past pre-compromise communication and ensuring the quasi-automatic recovery of anchor after detection even in the face of total control by an adversary, achieving respectively, perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and post-compromise security (PCS) . Third, since protocol designs are normally error prone, we formalise our protocol using a symbolic model and verify its core properties using the Tamarin prover [84] . Finally, our architecture promotes resilience, that is, the continued prevention of failure/compromise by automatic means. Though out of the scope of this article, the resilience of anchor using fault and intrusion tolerance techniques is part of our plans for future work, as we discuss in Section 8.
We show that, compared to the state of the art in SDN security, our solution preserves at least the same security functionality but achieves higher levels of implementation robustness by vulnerability reduction, whilst providing high performance. Whilst we try to prove our point with security, our contribution is generic enough to inspire further research concerning other non-functional properties (such as dependability or QoS). It is also worth emphasizing that the architectural concept that we propose in this article would require a greater effort to be deployed in traditional networks owing to the heterogeneity of the infrastructure and its vertical integration. This will be made clear throughout the article.
We have structured the article as follows. Section 2 gives the rationale and presents the generic logically centralized architecture for the system-wide enforcement of non-functional properties, and explains its benefits and limitations. In Section 3, we discuss the challenges and requirements brought by the current gaps in security-related non-functional properties. Section 4 describes the logically centralized security architecture that we propose, along with its mechanisms and algorithms. The main algorithms are co-designed with a formal model, and the formal verification of their security properties is presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss design and implementation aspects of the architecture. We present evaluation results in Section 7. In Section 8, we give a brief overview of related work then discuss some challenges and justify some design options of our architecture in Section 9. In Section 10, we present our conclusions.
THE ANCHOR ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we introduce anchor, a general architecture for logically centralized enforcement of non-functional properties in SDN, such as security, dependability, or QoS ( Figure 1 ). The logical centralization of the provision of non-functional properties allows us to (1) define and enforce global policies for those properties; (2) reduce the complexity of controllers and forwarding devices; (3) ensure higher levels of robustness for critical services; (4) foster interoperability of the non-functional property enforcement mechanisms; and (5) better promote the resilience of the architecture itself. Let us explain the rationale for these claims.
Defines and enforces global policies for non-functional properties. One can enforce nonfunctional properties through piece-wise, partial policies. However, it is easier and less error prone, as attested by SDN architectures with respect to the functional properties, to enforce, for example, security policies from a central trust point in a globally consistent way, especially when one considers changing policies during the system's lifetime.
Reduces the complexity of controllers and forwarding devices. One of the ideas of SDN was to simplify the construction of devices by stripping them of functionality, centralized on controllers. We are extending the scope of the concept by relieving both controllers and devices from ad-hoc and redundant implementations of mechanisms that are bound to have a critical impact on the whole network.
Ensures higher levels of robustness for critical services. Enforcing non-functional properties such as dependability or security has a critical scope, as it potentially affects the entire network. Unfortunately, the robustness of devices and controllers is still a concern, as they are becoming rather complex, which leads to several critical vulnerabilities, as amply exemplified in [110] . A centralized concept as we advocate might considerably improve on the situation because the enforcement of non-functional properties would be achieved through a specialized (carefully designed and verified) subsystem, minimally interfering with the SDN payload architecture.
Fosters interoperability of the non-functional property enforcement mechanisms. Different controllers require different configurations today, and a potential lack of interoperability in terms of non-functional properties arises. Having global policies and mechanisms for nonfunctional property enforcement also creates an easier path to foster controller and device interoperability (e.g., East and Westbound APIs).
Better promotes the resilience of the architecture itself. Having a specialized subsystem architecture already helps for a start since, for example, its operation is not affected by latency and throughput fluctuations of the (payload) control platforms themselves. However, the considerable advantage of both the decoupling and centralization is that it becomes straightforward to design in security and dependability measures for the architecture itself, such as advanced techniques and mechanisms to tolerate faults and intrusions (and, in essence, overcome the main disadvantage of centralization, the potential SPoF risk).
The outline of our architecture is depicted in Figure 1 . The logically centralized perspective of non-functional property enforcement is materialized through a subsystem architecture relying on an anchor of trust, a middleware whose main aim is to ensure that certain properties -for example, the security of control plane associations and of communication amongst controllers and devicesare met throughout the architecture.
In a manner similar to traditional security services, such as Kerberos and RADIUS, anchor is a set of services for the SDN architecture. It 'anchors' crucial functionality and properties, and 'hooks' to the former components in order to secure the desired properties. Thus, on the devices, we need only the local counterparts to the anchor middleware mechanisms and protocols, or hooks, to interpret and follow anchor's instructions. In contrast to traditional services, however, anchor targets SDN infrastructures; its advantage over existing systems is, in part, due to its specificity to this domain. After having made the case for logically centralized non-functional property enforcement in SDN and presenting the outline of our general architecture, in the next two sections we introduce the use case we elected to show in this article: logically centralized security. We start with a gap analysis that establishes the requirements for the architecture functionality in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we show how to populate anchor with the necessary mechanisms and protocols to meet those requirements.
CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY

Security versus Performance
The security/performance gap comes from the conflict between ensuring high performance and using secure primitives. This gap directly affects the control plane communication, which is the crucial link between controllers and forwarding devices, allowing remote configuration of the data plane at runtime. Control channels need to provide high performance (high throughput and low latency) while keeping communication secure.
The latency experienced by control plane communication is particularly critical for SDN operation. The increased latency is a problem per se, in terms of reduced responsiveness, but may also limit control plane scalability, which can be particularly problematic in large data centers [15] . Most of the existing commercial switches already show low control plane performance with TCP (e.g., a few hundred flows/s [69] , Section V.A.). Adding security worsens the problem: previous works have demonstrated that the use of cryptographic primitives has a perceivable impact on the latency of sensitive communication in OpenFlow-enabled networks [71, 72] and in HTTPS connections [87] , among other examples.
Ideally, we would want both security robustness and performance on control plane channels. In the context of the security-performance gap, some directions that we point to in our architectural proposal ahead are the careful selection of cryptographic primitives [71] ; the adoption of cryptographic libraries exhibiting a good performance/security trade-off, such as NaCl [18] ; and/or mechanisms that allow cheap per-message one-time key distribution [71, 72] . We return to these mechanisms later.
Complexity versus Robustness
The complexity/robustness gap represents the conflict between the current complexity of security based on cryptography and system implementations and the negative impact that this has on robustness and, hence, correctness, hindering the ultimate goal.
In the past few years, several studies have recurrently shown critical misuse issues of cryptographic APIs of different transport layer security (TLS) implementations [28, 42, 103] . One of the main root causes of these problems is the inherent complexity of traditional solutions and the knowledge required to use them without compromising security. For instance, recent reports have found different vulnerabilities in TLS implementations and have shown that longstanding implementations-such as OpenSSL 1 , including its extensive cryptography-are unlikely to be completely verified in the near future [22, 43] . To address this issue, a few projects, such as miTLS [24] and Everest [23] , propose new and verified implementations of TLS. However, several challenges remain to be addressed before having a solution ready for wide use [23] .
Whilst the problem persists, the number of security incidents remains non-negligible. Recent examples include vulnerabilities that allow the recovery of the secret key of OpenSSL at low ANCHOR: Logically Centralized Security for Software-Defined Networks 8:7
cost [129] and timing attacks that explore vulnerabilities in both PolarSSL and OpenSSL [12, 27] . On the other hand, failures in classical public key infrastructure (PKI)-based authentication and authorisation subsystems have been persistently happening [36, 51, 101] , with the sheer complexity of those systems being considered one of the root causes behind these problems.
Similarly to the cryptographic API example, the leading cause of most security issues in systems -and this includes SDN controllers, operating systems, hypervisors, and the like -is the inherent complexity of their implementation and the amount of aggregated functions and services, resulting in challenging ecosystems in terms of security [11, 37, 52, 64, 75, 98, 112, 116, 119, 130] . It is recognized by the community that complexity reduction (e.g., by means of isolation, modularization, reduced and verifiable code bases, and loosely coupled and well-defined micro-services) plays a vital role in ensuring the security of systems.
Considering the widely acknowledged principle that simplicity is key to robustness, especially for secure systems, we advocate and try to demonstrate in this article that the complexity/ robustness gap can be reduced through less complex but equally secure alternative solutions. For instance, we will show that it is possible to reduce complexity (when compared to traditional solutions, such as PKI/X.509 and TLS), and improve on security by designing simple and efficient protocols for the secure registration and association of network devices. By following this direction, we are applying the same principle of vulnerability reduction used in other systems, such as unikernels, in which the idea is to reduce the attack surface by generating a smaller overall footprint of the operating system and applications [126] .
Global Security Policies
The impact of the lack of global security policies can be illustrated with different examples. Although open networking foundation (ONF) describes data authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and freshness as fundamental requirements to ensure the security of control plane communication in SDN, it does so in an abstract way, and these measures are often ignored, or implemented in an ad-hoc manner [110] . Another example is the lack of strong authentication and authorisation in the control plane. Recent reports show that widely used controllers, such as Floodlight and OpenDaylight, employ weak network authentication mechanisms [75, 110, 112, 124] . This leads to any forwarding device being able to connect to any controller.
From a security perspective, it is non-controversial that device identification, authentication, and authorization should be among the forefront requirements of any network. All data plane devices should be appropriately registered and authenticated within the network domain, with each association request between any two devices (e.g., between a switch and a controller) being strictly authorized by a security policy enforcement point. In addition, control traffic should be secured, since it is the fundamental vehicle for network control programmability. This begs the question: why aren't these mechanisms employed in most deployments?
A reason for the current state of affairs is the lack of awareness, guidance, and enforcement policies. Therefore, it is becoming crucial to define and establish global policies and design, or adopt, the mechanisms needed to enforce them in order to meet the essential requirements (e.g., secure authentication and trustworthy authorization) to fill the policy gap.
Resilient Roots-of-Trust
A globally recognized, resilient root-of-trust could dramatically improve the global security of SDN since current approaches to achieve trust are ad-hoc and partial [1] . Solving this gap would certainly assist in fostering global mechanisms to ensure trustworthy registration and association between devices, as discussed before, but the benefits would go beyond that. For instance, a root-of-trust can be used to provide fundamental mechanisms (e.g., sources of strong entropy or pseudo-random generators (PRGs)), which would serve as building blocks for specific security functions.
As a first example, modern cryptography relies heavily on strong keys and the ability to keep them secret. The core feature that defines a strong key is its randomness. However, the randomness of keys is still a widely neglected issue [121] and, not surprisingly, weak entropy and weak random number generation have been the cause of several significant vulnerabilities [62] . Even long-standing cryptographic libraries such as OpenSSL have been recurrently affected by this problem [62, 92] . Importantly, recent research has shown that this problem also affects networking equipment [6, 49, 50] . For instance, a common pattern found in low-resource devices, such as switches, is that the random-number generator of the operating system may lack the input of external sources of entropy to generate reliable cryptographic keys.
It is worth emphasizing that the resilient roots-of-trust gap lies in the relative trust that can be put in partial ad-hoc implementations of critical functions by controller developers and manufacturers of devices in contrast to a careful, once-and-for-all architectural approach that can be reinstantiated in different SDN deployments. The list not being exhaustive, we claim that strong sources of entropy; resilient, indistinguishable-from-random-number generators; and accurate, non-forgeable global time services are fitting examples of such critical functions to be provided by logically centralized roots-of-trust, helping close the former gap.
LOGICALLY CENTRALIZED SECURITY
In this section, we introduce the specialization of the anchor architecture for logically centralized security properties enforcement (Figure 2) , guided by the conclusions from the previous section. Our main goal is to provide security properties such as authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality for control plane communication. To achieve this goal, the anchor provides mechanisms (e.g., registration, authentication, a source of strong entropy, a PRG) required to fulfill some of the major security requirements of SDNs.
As illustrated in Figure 2 , we anchor the enforcement of security properties on anchor, which provides all of the necessary mechanisms and protocols to achieve the goal. It is also a central point for enforcing security policies by means of services such as device registration, device association, controller recommendation, or global time, thereby reducing the burden on controllers and forwarding devices, which need only the local hooks, protocol elements that interpret and follow the anchor's instructions. Next, we review the components and essential security services provided by anchor. We first illustrate in Section 4.1 how we implement our strategy of improving the robustness of anchor as a single root-of-trust by hardening anchor in the face of failures. For example, concerning the mitigation of possible (though expectedly infrequent) security failures, we provide countermeasures such as PFS and PCS, protecting pre-and post-compromise communications in the presence of successful attacks. Next, we propose a source of strong entropy (Section 4.2) and a resilient pseudo-random generator (Section 4.3) for generating security-sensitive materials. These are crucial components, as attested by the impact of vulnerabilities discovered in the recent past, in suboptimal implementations of the former in several software packages [20, 85, 108, 134] . We implement and evaluate the robustness of these mechanisms. We also leverage a recently proposed mechanism, the integrated device verification value (iDVV), to simplify authentication, authorization, and key generation amongst SDN components [71] , which we review and put in the context of anchor (Section 4.4). Namely, the iDVV protocol runs between anchor and the hooks in controllers and switching devices. We implement and evaluate iDVV generators for OpenFlow-enabled control plane communication. After defining system roles and its setup in Section 4.5, we present two essential services for secure network operation-device registration (Section 4.6) and device association (Section 4.7)-and we describe how the above mechanisms interplay with our secure device-to-device communication approach (Section 4.8). The list of services of anchor is certainly not closed. One can think of other functionalities, such as tracking of forwarding devices association, alert generation in case of anomalous behaviours (e.g., recurrent reconnections), and so forth.
In what follows, we describe the main anchor services in detail. To help the reader follow our descriptions, we summarize the most important notations used in Table 1 .
Hardening ANCHOR
The compromise of a root-of-trust is of great concern, since crucial services normally depend on it being secure and dependable. As we stated before, we have a long-term strategy towards the resilience of anchor. In the context of this article, it starts by improving the inherent reliability of its simplex (non-replicated) version by hardening it in the face of failures. For instance, in contrast to existing traditional security services such as Kerberos and RADIUS, we still provide some security guarantees even when anchor has been compromised. In particular, we propose protocols to achieve two security properties guaranteeing the security of past (pre-compromise) communications and of future (post-recovery) communications. This provides a significant improvement over other existing root-of-trust infrastructures.
The first security property is perfect forward secrecy (PFS), the assurance that the compromise of all secrets in a current session does not compromise the confidentiality of the communications of the past sessions. The enforcement of PFS is systematically approached in the algorithms that we present next.
The second property is post-compromise security (PCS). While PFS considers how to protect the past communications, PCS considers how to automatically reinstate and re-establish secure communication channels for future communications. This security property has so far been considered only in the specific scenario of secure messaging [133] , and only limited works [131, 132] are available. In particular, we consider that when anchor has been compromised by an attacker (e.g., through the exploitation of software vulnerabilities), and has been reinstated by the operator (e.g., by applying software patches and rebuilding servers), the system should have a way to automatically re-establish secure communications between anchor and all other participants without having to reinstate these components (controllers and forwarding devices in this case, whose shared secrets became compromised). In particular, in Section 4.9, we explain how to re-establish secure communication channels in a semi-automatic way after complete failure of anchor.
In summary, even though anchor is a single root-of-trust in our system, we mitigate the associated risks by guaranteeing the following:
• PFS-the compromise of anchor in the current session does not expose past communications; and • PCS-when anchor is compromised and reinstated, anchor can automatically re-establish secure communication channels with all other participants in the system to protect the security of future communications.
As a side note, since our system uses only symmetric key cryptography, it will stand up even against an attacker with quantum computers. In other words, our infrastructure will be postquantum secure (PQS).
A Source of Strong Entropy
Entropy still represents a challenge for modern computers because they have been designed to behave deterministically [121] . Sources of true randomness (e.g., physical phenomena such as atmospheric noise) can be difficult to use because they work differently from a typical computer.
To avoid the pitfalls of weak sources of entropy-in particular, in networking devices-anchor provides a source of strong entropy to ensure the randomness required to generate seeds, pseudorandom values, and secrets, among other cryptographic material. The strong source of entropy has the following property:
Strong Entropy -Every value entropy returned by entropy_get is indistinguishable-fromrandom.
Algorithm 1 shows how the external (from other devices) and internal (from the local operating system) sources of entropy are kept updated and used to generate random bytes per function call (entropy_get()). The state of the internal and external entropy is initially set by calling the entropy_setup(data). This function requires input data, which can be a combination of current system time, process number, and bytes from special devices, among other things, along with random bytes (rand_bytes()) from a local (deterministic) source of entropy (e.g., /dev/urandom) to initialize the state of the entropy generator. As we cannot assume anything regarding the predictability of the input data, we use it in conjunction with a rand_bytes() function call (line 2). A call to rand_bytes() is assumed to return (by default) 64B of random data.
Function entropy_update() uses as input the statistics of external sources and the anchor's own packet arrival rate to update the external entropy. The noise (events) of the external sources of entropy is stored in 32 pools (P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , . . . , P 31 ), as suggested by previous work [45] . Each pool has an event counter, which is reset to zero once the pool is used to update the external entropy. At e_entropy ← rand_bytes() ⊕ H(data) 3: i_entropy ← rand_bytes() ⊕ e_entropy 4: entropy_update() 5 :
E_counter ← 0 7: entropy_get() 8: if E_counter >= MAX_LONG call entropy_update() 9: i_entropy ← H(rand_bytes() || E_counter) 10: entropy ← e_entropy ⊕ i_entropy every update, two different pools of noise (P i and P j ) are used as input of a hashing function H . The two pools of noise can be randomly selected, for instance. The output of this function is XORed with the internal entropy to generate the new state of the external entropy. It is worth emphasizing that entropy_update() is automatically called when E_counter (the global event counter) reaches its maximum value and whenever needed, that is, the user can define when to do the function call.
The resulting 64B of entropy, indistinguishable-from-random bytes (entropy_get()), are the outcome of an XOR operation between the external and internal entropy. While the external entropy provides the unpredictability required by strong entropy, the internal source provides a good, yet predictable [121] , continuous source of entropy. At each time that the entropy_get() function is called, the internal entropy is updated by using a local source of random data, which is typically provided by a library or by the operating system itself, and the global number of events currently in the 32 pools of noise (E_counter ). These two values are used as input of a hashing function H .
Such sources of strong entropy can be achieved in practice by combining different sources of noise, such as the unpredictability of network traffic [47] , the unpredictability of idleness of links [16] , packet arrival rate of network controllers, and sources of entropy provided by operating systems. We provide implementation details in Section 6.1. A discussion about the correctness of Algorithm 1 can be found in Appendix A of [73] .
Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG)
A source of entropy is necessary but not sufficient. Most cryptographic algorithms are highly vulnerable weaknesses of random generators [40] . For instance, nonces generated with weak pseudorandom generators can lead to attacks capable of recovering secret keys. Different security properties need to be ensured when building strong PRGs, such as resilience, forward security, backward security, and recovering security. The latter was recently proposed as a measure to recover the internal state of a PRG [40] . We propose a PRG that uses our source of strong entropy and implements a refresh function to increase its resilience and recovery capability. The PRG has the following property:
Robust PRG: Every value nprd returned by the function PRG_next is indistinguishable-fromrandom.
A robust PRG needs three well-defined constructions-setup(), refresh() (or re-seed), and next()-as described in Algorithm 2. The internal state of our PRG is represented by three variables: the seed, the counter and the next pseudo-random data nprd. The setup process generates a new seed by using our strong source of entropy, which is used to update the internal state. In line 3, we initialize the counter by calling the lonд_uint () function, which returns a long unsigned seed ← entropy_get()
counter ← long_uint(entropy_get()) 4: call entropy_update()
5:
nprd ← seed ⊕ entropy_get()
seed ← entropy_get()
counter ← long_uint(entropy_get())
nprd ← H(seed nprd counter)
10: PRG_next()
11:
counter ← counter -1
12:
if counter <= 0 call PRG_refresh()
13:
nprd ← HMAC(seed, nprd counter)
int value that will be used to re-seed and to generate the next pseudo-random value. In line 4, we call entropy_update () to make sure that the external entropy gets updated before calling the entropy_дet () function one more time. The first nprd is the outcome of an XOR operation between the newly generated seed and a second call to our source of entropy. It is worth emphasizing that the setup of the initial state of the PRG does not require any intervention or interaction with the end user. We provide strong and reliable entropy to set up the initial values of all three variables. This ensures that our PRG is non-sensitive to the initial state. For instance, in a traditional PRG, the user could provide an initial seed, or other setup values, that could compromise the quality of the generator's output. The counter , which is concatenated with the nprd (lines 9 and 13), gives the idea of an unbounded state space [118] . This is possible because we are using cryptographically strong primitives such as a hash function H and the MAC function HMAC. Thus, in theory, we have unbounded state spaces, that is, we can keep concatenating values to the input of these primitives.
The PRG_refresh() function updates the internal state, that is, the seed, the counter , and the nprd. It uses H to update the state of the nprd. Finally, the PRG_next() function outputs a new indistinguishable-from-random stream of bytes, applying HMAC on the internal state. In this function, the counter is decremented by one. The idea is for it to start with a very large unsigned 8B value, which is used until it reaches zero. At this point, the PRG_refresh() function will be called to update the internal state of the generator. The newly generated nprd is the outcome of an HMAC function with a dimension of 128b.
The main motivation for having a PRG along with a strong source of entropy is speed. Studies have shown that entropy generation can be rather slow, such as 1.5s to 2min for generating 128b of entropy [79] . Our source of entropy uses external entropy and random bytes from special devices, whereas the PRG uses an HMAC function in order to have a fast and reliable generation of pseudorandom values.
In spite of the fact that we could use any good PRG to generate cryptographic material (e.g., keys, a nonce), it is worth emphasizing that we introduce a PRG that works in a seamless way with our strong source of entropy, improving its quality. In Section 6.2, we discuss the specifics of the implementation. We also evaluate the robustness and level of confidence of our algorithms in Section 7.1. A discussion about the correctness of Algorithm 2 can be found in Appendix B of [73] .
Integrated Device Verification Value (iDVV)
The design of our logically centralized security architecture also includes the iDVV component [71] . The iDVV idea was inspired by the integrated card verification values (iCVVs) used in credit cards to authenticate and authorize transactions in a secure and inexpensive way. In [71] , the concept was applied to SDN, proposing a flexible method of generating iDVVs that can be safely used to secure communication between any two devices. As a result, iDVVs can be used to partially address two gaps of non-functional properties, security/performance and complexity/robustness. iDVVs are sequentially generated to authenticate and authorize requests between two networking devices and/or to protect communication. Starting with the same seed and secret, the iDVV generator will generate, for example, at both ends of a controller-device association the same sequence of values. In other words, it is a deterministic generator of authentication or authorization codes, or one-time keys, which are indistinguishable from random, however. The main advantages of iDVVs are their low cost, which makes them usable even on a per-message basis, and the fact that they can be generated off-line, that is, without having to establish any previous agreement.
The analysis provided in [71] and in this article show that iDVVs achieve a high level of confidence and outperform traditional key generation functions without compromising the security.
System Roles and Setup
In our system, we assume the existence of personnel with two different roles: the system administrator, that controls the operation of central services such as anchor, and the network administrator (i.e., manager), responsible for the operation of network devices. Every time a new network device (a forwarding device or a controller) is added to the network, it must first be registered before being able to operate.
In current practice, device registration is a manual process triggered by a network administrator through an out-of-band channel. Given the potentially large number of network devices in SDN, a manual process is unsatisfactory. Thus, we propose a protocol, described below, to fulfil the desire for a semi-automated device registration process that is efficient, secure, and requires the least involvement of anchor. anchor is first set up by the system administrator. Next, each network device is set up by anchor. Before that process, the network administrator has to share a secret key with the device. The setup of this key and the registration of devices is described in Section 4.6. Then, the devices can be registered automatically. Now, we present the deployment, communication, and setup required for anchor (by the system administrator), network administrator, and devices. We then describe the device registration and association algorithms.
Deploying Anchor. Currently, anchor is designed to work in a single domain, with single ownership, such as a data center, enterprise, or university campus network. anchor supports deployments with multiple controller instances [66] for scalability and availability of network control, as is required in production systems [57] . It is worth emphasizing that it is part of our plan to extend anchor's features and services to multiple domains with multiple ownership.
Connectivity infrastructure. anchor is designed to logically centralize non-functional properties of generic SDN deployments. As such, it is not restricted to OpenFlow. Other southbound APIs can be used, such as POF, ForCES, or P4. The anchor connectivity infrastructure, used for communication between SDN devices (controllers and networking gear) and anchor, can use traditional in-band or out-of-band mechanisms (e.g., traditional routing protocols such as OSPF or IS-IS, as is common for control plane channels [66] In what follows, anchor can generate strong keys using a suitable KDF based on the high-entropy random material described in the previous sections.
Anchor setup. anchor needs two master recovery keys, the master recovery encryption key Ke r ec and master recovery MAC key Kh r ec , fundamental for the post-compromise recovery steps described later. However, these two master recovery keys, in possession of the authority overseeing anchor (the system administrator), must never appear in the anchor server (if they are to recover from a possible full server compromise), being securely stored and used only in an offline manner 2 . Owing to space constraints, we refer the reader to Appendix C of [73] for more information (including a visual representation) regarding the three phases of anchor, namely, setup, normal operation, and recovery.
As we will present later, the master recovery keys are used in only two cases: (a) when a new network administrator is registered with anchor (i.e., the network administrator setup process) and (b) when anchor was compromised and is reinstated into a trustworthy state (i.e. the postcompromise recovery process presented in Section 4.9). When either case occurs, the anchor authority needs to use the master recovery keys only once to recursively compute the recovery keys of all devices and network administrators. The output of the calculation will be imported into the anchor server through an out-of-band channel (e.g., by using a USB).
Network administrator setup. Each network administrator (or manager, denoted M) with identity M_ID is registered with anchor manually. This is the only manual process to initialize a new M. Afterwards, all devices managed by this M can be registered with anchor through our device registration protocol.
During the network administrator registration phase, anchor locally generates encryption key Ke AM and MAC key Kh AM to be shared with M, and they are manually imported into M through an out-of-band channel (again, e.g., by using a USB).
Further, M recovery keys Kre AM = H(Ke r ec ||M_ID) and Krh AM = H(Kh r ec ||M_ID) are also computed by anchor offline. M recovery keys live essentially offline, since M needs to perform only infrequent operations with these keys (e.g., upon device registration). Note that anchor does not store Kre AM or Krh AM as well but can recompute them offline when the post-compromise recovery process is triggered, as we detail in Section 4.9.
Device setup. A device with identity D i is either a forwarding device (F) or a controller (C), but we do not differentiate them during the setup and registration processes. The first operation to be made after a device is first brought to the system is the setup, which, in the context of this article, concerns the establishment of credentials for secure management access by the network administrator.
Upon request from M, anchor locally generates a pair of keys for each device D i being set up, Ke M D i and Kh M D i , to be the encryption and MAC key, respectively, to be shared between M and D i for management. They are sent to M under the protection of Ke AM and Kh AM . Then, they are manually imported by the network administrator into each D i through an out-of-band channel.
Device Registration
The device registration protocol is presented in Algorithm 3. We assume that Ke M D i and Kh M D i , described above, are in place.
The first part concerns the bootstrap of the registration of a batch of devices with anchor (A), by a network administrator M. Let {D i } n i=1 be the set of n device identities that the administrator wants to register. M requests (line 1) the registration to A, accompanying each D i with a nonce Note that in Algorithm 3, the update of several shared keys (i.e., lines 11, 15, 17, and 18) at the end of the registration steps at A, M, and D i is used to provide PFS. When a key is updated, the old one is destroyed. Continuing, in line 12, M closes the loop with D i , using the original nonce from A, finally confirming D i 's registration. Upon this step, both M and D i perform the key update just mentioned.
Note that the generation process of the recovery keys Krh AD i and Krh AD i lies with M (line 4), though using its recovery keys shared with anchor, Kre AM and Krh AM . This reduces the number of uses of the master recovery key. However, as we will see, albeit not knowing Kre AD i , Krh AD i , Kre AM , and Krh AM , anchor can easily compute them offline, if needed. Second, Kre AM and Krh AM possessed by the network administrator are used only when new devices need to be registered. Thus, Kre AM and Krh AM can be usually stored offline. This provides an extra layer of security.
Device Association
The association service is required for authorizing control plane channels between any two devices, such as a forwarding device and a controller. A forwarding device has to request an association with a controller it wishes to communicate with. This association is mediated by the anchor.
The association process between two devices is performed by the sequence of steps detailed in Algorithm 4. Registered controllers and forwarding devices are inserted in CList and FList, 
respectively. Note that, as explained above, the registration process set in place shared secret keys between anchor (A) and any controller C or forwarding device F. The device association implemented by Algorithm 4 has the following properties:
Controller Authorization: Any device F can associate to a controller C only if authorized by anchor.
Device Authorization: Any device F can associate to some controller only if F is authorized by the anchor.
Association ID Secrecy: After termination of the algorithm, the association ID (AiD) is known only to F and C.
Seed Secrecy: After termination of the algorithm, the seed (SEED) is known only to F and C. The algorithm coarse structure follows the line of the Needham-Schroeder (NS) original authentication and key distribution algorithm [88] but contemplates anti-replay measures such as including participant IDs and a global initial nonce, as suggested in [93] . Unlike NS, it uses encryptthen-mac to further prevent impersonation. Furthermore, it is specialized for device association, managing authorization lists and distributing a double secret in the end (association ID and seed). Secure communication protocols running after association can, as explained in Section 4.8, use iDVVs on a key-per-message or key-per-session basis, rolling from the initial seed and secret association ID.
The association process starts with a forwarding device (F) sending an association request to the anchor (A) (line 1 in Algorithm 4). This request contains a nonce x д , the identification of the device and the operation request GetCList (get list of controllers). The request also contains an HMAC to avoid device impersonation attacks. The anchor checks whether F is in FList (registered devices) and, if so, it replies (line 2) with a list of controllers (CList(F)) which F is authorized to associate with. The list of controllers (and the nonce x д ) is encrypted using a key (set up during registration) shared between A and F. This protects the confidentiality of the list of controllers and x д ensures that the message is fresh, providing protection against replay attacks. A message authentication code also protects the integrity of anchor's reply, avoiding impersonation attacks. Next, F sends an association request to the chosen controller C (line 3). The request contains a message that is encrypted using a key shared between F and A. This message contains the get association id (GetAiD) request, the identity of the principals involved (F,C), a nonce x f , and binds to the nonce x д . The controller forwards this message to A (line 4), adding its own encrypted association request field, similar to F's, but containing C's own nonce x c instead. This prevents the impersonation of the controller since only it would be able to encrypt the freshly generated x д . In line 5, C trusts that A's reply is fresh because it contains x д . The controller also trusts that it is genuine (from A) because it contains x c . As such, C endorses F as an authorized device and AiD as the association key for F. Future compromise of A should not represent any threat to established communication between C and F. To achieve this goal, A immediately destroys the AiD (line 6) and C and F further share a seed not known by A (line 7).
C forwards both the encrypted AiD message and its seed to F (line 7). The forwarding device trusts that this message is fresh and correct because it contains x д , and x f under encryption, together with the AiD, only known to F and C, which it then endorses as the association key. F trusts that C is the correct correspondent; otherwise, A would not have advanced to step 5. That being true, future interactions will use AiD. F believes that the SEED is genuine, as random entropy for future interactions, because it is encapsulated by AiD, known only to C and F. The forwarding device also trusts that the message is fresh because it contains x д . Finally (line 8), C trusts it is associated with F (as identified in step 3 and confirmed by A in step 5), when F replies showing that it knows both the AiD and the SEED by encrypting the SEED XOR'ed with the current nonce x д , with AiD. Replay and impersonation attacks are avoided because all encrypted interactions are dependent on nonces; thus, they will become void in the future. At the end of each device association protocol, all keys shared between a device (F or C) and anchor will be updated to the hash value of this key (lines 9 and 10). Again, this is used to provide perfect forward secrecy. All nonces are random, that is, not predictable.
A discussion of the correctness of Algorithm 4 can be found in Appendix D of [73] .
Device-to-Device Communication
Communication between any two devices happens only after a successful association. Consider the end of an association establishment, as per Algorithm 4, for example, between a controller C and a forwarding device F: at this point, both sides, and only those, have the secret and unique material (SEED, AiD). Using them, they can bootstrap the iDVV protocol (see Section 4.4), which from now on can be used at will by any secure communication primitives. As explained earlier, and detailed in [71] , iDVV generation is flexible and low cost, allowing use (a) on a per message basis, (b) for a sequence of messages, (c) for a specific interval of time, or (d) for one communication session. NaCl [18] , as mentioned in previous sections, is a simple, efficient, and secure alternative to OpenSSL-like implementations; thus, it is our choice for secure communication amongst devices.
Post-Compromise Recovery
As previously explained, when anchor is reinstated after a compromise, it is crucial to have a way to automatically re-establish the secure communication channels between anchor and all participants.
Algorithm 5 presents our solution to re-establish secure communication channels when anchor is compromised. Intuitively, since anchor's master recovery keys Ke r ec and Kh r ec are stored securely offline, they are unknown to an attacker who has stolen all secrets from the anchor server. As described before, all M and all D i recovery keys can be recursively computed from the master keys offline (line 1). Then, the system administrator imports those keys into the anchor server. To continue the recovery process, anchor generates new random keys to be shared with all Ms, and all D i (line 2).
Then, anchor sends to each M (line 3) a recovery message to re-share keys (contained in M k ) with the devices under the network administrator's control. The messages are encrypted with the corresponding recovery keys. The new shared keys will be used to protect future communications. Note that in line 3, we create an additional MAC value on the entire message under the current MAC key Kh AM . Since the recovery keys are stored offline, without having this additional MAC 
value, the network administrator would have to perform the verification offline manually. This MAC value prevents possible DoS attacks in which an attacker creates and sends fake recovery messages to network managers, as this additional MAC value can be verified online efficiently. Each M implements the recovery operation with each of the devices it manages (line 4). The new keys replace the possibly compromised keys at M and each D i (lines 5, 6, and 9). Likewise, when the recovery process has been completed, the recovery keys will be updated to their hash value (lines 7, 8, 10, and 11). As mentioned previously, this key update is used to provide PFS.
If the keys of the network administrator M get compromised (e.g., if M loses its keys), they can be recovered using the recovery keys provided by A. Moreover, M can also re-establish its shared secrets with anchor and its devices in a way similar to that described in Algorithm 5. However, the steps are made only for a single M instead of all M, and with some differences, which we detail next. First, M gets the recovery keys (line 1) from anchor through an out-of-band channel: Kre AM , Krh AM , and all Kre AD i , Krh AD i from i = 1 to n. Then, in lines and 2-3, M will get (generated by A) 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
We provide formal machine-checked verification of the core security properties of anchor, using the Tamarin prover. In particular, we formalise the core protocols of anchor-including device registration protocol, device association protocol, and post-compromise recovery protocolthrough symbolic modeling. In addition, for each of the protocols, we verify its correctness, message confidentiality, and PFS. Moreover, we verify the post-compromise security of anchor with the post-compromise recovery protocol.
The full model contains 1712 lines of code (LOCs). In total, we have proved 33 properties-23 of them are helper lemmas for the theorem prover to understand anchor better; 4 lemmas are sanity proofs which check the correctness of our protocols and their formalisation; and 6 are main security properties that ensure the message confidentiality, PFS, and post-compromise security of anchor. We provide all input files and complete formal model required to understand and reproduce our security analysis in [9] .
Security Properties
anchor achieves both classical security properties and novel security properties. In a classical sense, the confidentiality of communications between any two devices is guaranteed. In particular, anchor also provides PFS, namely, if a device is compromised, then all communications of this device from the past are still secure.
For the novel security guarantee, as mentioned before, rather than assuming that the trusted party cannot be compromised, such as CAs in X.509 PKI or the KDC in Kerberos, we also consider that anchor might be compromised. In this case, we assume that there are means to detect that the compromise has happened, and then the system can be recovered through our post-compromise recovery protocol, which also guarantees perfect forward security when anchor is compromised and recovered.
Formal Analysis
We analyse the main security properties of the protocol using the Tamarin prover [84] . The Tamarin prover is a symbolic analysis tool that can prove properties of security protocols for an unbounded number of instances and supports reasoning about protocols with a mutable global state, which makes it suitable for our protocols. Protocols are specified using multiset rewriting rules, and properties are expressed in a guarded fragment of first-order logic that allows quantification over timepoints.
Tamarin is capable of automatic verification in many cases; it also supports interactive verification by manual traversal of the proof tree. If the tool terminates without finding a proof, it returns a counter-example. Counter-examples are given as so-called dependency graphs, which are partially ordered sets of rule instances that represent a set of executions that violate the property. Counterexamples can then be used to refine the model and give feedback to the implementer and designer.
Modeling Aspects
As explained earlier, we consider four protocol roles in anchor: A (anchor), M (network Manager), F (Forwarding device), and C (Controller). To simplify our model, we consider an additional role D (Device) to represent any kind of network device when it is irrelevant to distinguish its type (i.e., F or C).
We model the above protocol roles by a set of rewrite rules. Our modeling of the roles follows the typical Tamarin models and directly corresponds to the algorithm descriptions in the previous sections. Specifically, each rewrite rule typically models receiving a message, taking an appropriate action, and sending a response message. Tamarin provides built-in support for a Dolev-Yao style network attacker, that is, one who is in full control of the network. We also specify rules that enable the attacker to compromise anchor and/or any device in the network and learn all of their session keys.
Proof Goals
We state several proof goals as specified in Tamarin's syntax. Since Tamarin's property specification language is a fragment of first-order logic, it contains logical connectives (|, &, ==>, not, . . . ) and quantifiers (All, Ex). In Tamarin, proof goals are marked as lemma. The # prefix is used to denote timepoints; "E @ #i" expresses that the event E occurs at timepoint i. Due to space limitation, we present only a set of examples selected from our full model to explain the core ideas. We refer the reader to the full model and detailed proof results available in [9] .
The first example goal is a check for executability that ensures that our model allows for the successful transmission of a message. The following example, which is a correctness lemma in the device registration protocol, shows how it is encoded in our proof. The property holds if the Tamarin model exhibits a behaviour in which a device D of any type with unique identity Did can successfully exchange with anchor A a message k encrypted by using a secret keAD shared between D and A. This property mainly serves as a sanity check on the model. If it does not hold, it would mean our model does not model the normal message flow, which could indicate a flaw in the model. Tamarin automatically proves this property and generates the expected trace in the form of a graphical representation of the rule instantiations and the message flow. We additionally proved several other sanity-checking properties to minimize the risk of modeling errors.
The second example goal is the core secrecy property with respect to a classical attacker. When a controller C is associated with a forwarding device F, then the following expresses that unless the attacker compromises either C or F, the attacker cannot learn any messages exchanged between them. Note that K(m) is a special event that denotes that the attacker knows m at this time. Tamarin also proves this property automatically. The above result implies that if a forwarding device F with identity Did1 and a controller C with identity Did2 has exchanged a message k encrypted under a shared seed, and the attacker did not compromise any device at any time, then the attacker will not learn k.
Similarly, the following example expresses the PFS for the communications between two devices. Tamarin proves this property automatically, and the result also implies that the message is secure if the attacker did not compromise any device before the current communication session.
The final example property encodes the post-compromise security guarantees provided by anchor. In this example, if anchor was compromised and then recovered through our protocol, then the confidentiality of communications between anchor and forwarding device F is guaranteed. The property states that if anchor was compromised at session i1 and the recovery action has been completed afterwards at session i2, then the confidentiality of message k exchanged in a later time between A and forwarding device F is guaranteed.
The above properties are all proven automatically by the Tamarin prover on a PC 3 within 15min.
IMPLEMENTATION
A prototype of anchor has been implemented as envisioned in Figure 2 . To strengthen our confidence in the effectiveness of deployment of anchor in a production environment, we have implemented two versions of the system. The first uses the POX controller and CBench 4 (OpenFlow switches emulator). This version has approximately 2k lines of Python code and 700 lines of C code (integration with CBench). It uses Google's protobuf (https://developers.google.com/ protocol-buffers/) for defining the protocols and efficiently serializing the data. The second is a slightly simplified version using the Ryu controller and Open vSwitch. In this section, we give an overview of the most relevant implementation details. The evaluation of the different components of the architecture is presented in Section 7.
Source of Strong Entropy
We have 32 pools of events fed by four different sources: (1) incoming packet rate sent by controllers, (2) incoming packet rate of anchor, (3) network statistics of forwarding devices, and (4) random bytes from local systems. Each of the sources feeds the pools in its own way. Sources (1) and (3) use a round-robin approach, whereas sources (2) and (4) randomly select the next pool to put the new event in. In this way, we have a diversity of approaches for feeding the pools of noise, making the "guessing task" of an attacker harder. Each pool needs to store only the digest of the SHA512 hashing function. The current digest and the newly arrived events are used as input of the hashing function. Last, once the pool has been used by the source of strong entropy, it is reset to a new initial state, which consists of the digest of a hash function using as input random bytes of a local entropy source such as /dev/urandom. To implement the entropy_update() function (see Algorithm 1), we can use the pools of noise circularly (e.g., P 0 and P 1 , P 2 and P 3 , and so forth) in a combined circular and random way (P 0 and P 7 , P 1 and P 31 , and so forth) or in a completely random fashion. The number of pools (32) and this diversity of approaches for using the pools make it very hard for an attacker to enumerate the possible values for the events used to update the generator's internal state [45] . Even if an attacker is controlling two or more external sources in a timely manner, it will be hard to guess the new state of the external entropy. First, the attacker needs to enumerate the events of the pools being used on each update. This, by itself, is something hard to achieve since the attacker does not know the update sequence of these pools, that is, which external sources are being used, in which sequence, to update each pool. In other words, the attacker would have to know all sources of noise and the sequence in which they are being used to update the pools. It is also worth emphasizing that the external sources need to have a predefined maximum rate for sending the heartbeats, that is, compromised sources cannot send data at a higher frequency to influence subsequent updates of the external entropy. Second, the attacker would need to have additional knowledge regarding the internal entropy.
Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG)
Our PRG combines the implementation strengths of different solutions such as the PRF of SPINS [95] (which is based on an HMAC function), provably secure constructions for building robust PRGs [40, 45] , and unbounded state spaces through cryptographic primitives [118] .
As the HASH function, we have chosen SHA512. As the HMAC function, we have chosen the one-time authentication function crypto_onetimeauth() from NaCl [18] . This function ensures security and performance while generating outputs of 16B that are indistinguishable from random.
PRG at the devices. As the controllers and forwarding devices do not have a source of strong entropy, we implemented a slightly modified version of the algorithm for these components to use this logically centralized security service provided by anchor. Essentially, we replace the entropy_get() function by entropy_remote(). Instead of using local data, this function makes an entropy request to anchor to obtain a source of strong entropy. This function is essential to provide recovering security by refreshing, improving the resilience of the PRG.
Secure Cryptographic Key Generators
Based on the algorithm proposed in [71] , we have implemented an iDVV-based secure cryptographic key generator that supports seven different cryptographic primitives. Specifically, we use each of these primitives as input to the idvv_next(primitive_id) function that is used to generate the next key. In our implementation, we used the following primitives: MD5, SHA1, SHA512, SHA256, poly1305aes_ authenticate, crypto_onetimeauth, and crypto_hash. Whilst the first four functions are provided by OpenSSL, the last three are provided by an independent implementation of Poly1305-AES and NaCl. As MD5 and SHA1 are deprecated, we use them only for performance comparison purposes.
To understand the rationale for our implementation, we give a bit of context to clarify the difference between our solution and traditional KDFs. Both solutions are used to generate secure cryptographic keys that can resist different types of attacks, such as exhaustive key search attacks [128] . KDFs have common design characteristics, such as strong hash functions to compute digests for the raw key material. A secure KDF can be defined as H (c ) (p||s ||c) [128] . H is a strong hash function, such as SHA256 or SHA512. The exponent c represents the number of iterations used to make the task of the attackers harder. A common value for c is 2 16 . This exponent is particularly necessary if the entropy of the input p (e.g., password, seed, key) is unknown. In practice, the input of the KDF is likely to be of low entropy [128] . While in some use cases a high exponent c might be necessary to increase the cost of an attack trying to recover the key, it also significantly increases the cost of the key derivation function for high-performance latency-sensitive applications.
In contrast to a traditional key derivation scheme, our implementation using the iDVV generator in the context of anchor uses high-entropy values. In other words, we do not need to recur to the exponent c as a means to compensate a potentially low-entropy p. By using by default two 32B indistinguishable-from-random values in our generator, we make the task of an attacker very hard. It is also worth mentioning that iDVVs are essentially used in an association basis, that is, they have a relatively short lifetime.
Implementation Using Ryu and Open vSwitch
We have implemented a second, simplified version of the system focused on the essential registration and authorization functions of anchor. We have used the Ryu controller [106] for the control plane, and Open vSwitch (OVS; https://www.openvswitch.org/) for the data plane. Ryu fully supports all versions of OpenFlow, including Nicira Extensions, and is officially integrated into OpenStack Networking (Neutron). OVS is the main software switch used in virtualised data centers (e.g., VMWare NSX [123] , OpenStack [120] , OpenShift [104] ). In addition, physical switches such as the Pica8 family [96] rely on PicOS [97] , a user-space application running on top of an unmodified Linux kernel, providing OpenFlow support (versions 1.0-1.4) through integration with standard Open vSwitch. This second implementation further strengthens our case for the effectiveness of deployment of anchor in production SDN systems that include both software and hardware data planes.
We modified Open vSwitch (v2.10.0) and Ryu (v4.28) to support the registration and association functions provided by anchor. To evaluate our solution on a realistic scenario using the Mininet emulator (https://github.com/mininet/mininet) [13, 38, 46, 60, 74, 125, 127] (further details in Section 7.4), we modified the behavior of the core hub module (ryu/lib/hub.py) of Ryu. Similarly, we changed the behavior of the communication stack (ovs/lib/stream) of OVS. Specifically, instead of just opening a new communication channel with the controller, our modified OVS registers itself with anchor (having obtained the network administrator's authorization) and sends an association request to the controller. In Section 7.4, we present the results of anchor providing network protection against a rogue switch that is added to the network by an attacker as an example use case.
EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the essential security mechanisms and services of our architecture.
For the performance measurements, we used machines with two quad-core Intel Xeon E5620 2.4GHz, with 2x4x256KB L2/2x12MB L3 cache, 32GB SDIMM at 1066MHz, with hyper-threading enabled. These machines were interconnected by a Gigabit Ethernet switch and ran Ubuntu Server 14.04 LTS.
Source of Entropy and PRGs
We empirically evaluate both the source of strong entropy and PRGs through statistical methods and tools, following state-of-the-art recommendations [14] . To achieve our goal, we used NIST's test suite [89] . We generated one file containing 50MB of random bits per generator. These files were used as input for the test suite tool STS [89] . In the end, our generators passed the absolute majority of tests and sub-tests: they failed only 2 sub-tests out of 188 (passed 146 out of 148 non-overlapping template matching), as summarized in Table 2 . This gives a very high level of confidence to our generators.
On the Performance of Key Generation
In this section, we analyse the performance of our key generator, which is essential to provide low-latency and high-throughput control plane communication at a low cost. Figure 3(a) shows the latency of the seven cryptographic primitives that we used with our generator. We tested each primitive by generating keys of different sizes (16, 32, 64, and 128B) . The best performance is achieved by the implementations based on SHA1 and MD5, as expected. However, these two implementations also have the worst serial correlation coefficient, as shown in [71] . The generators that use SHA512 or Poly-OTP have good performance, achieving a good security/ performance trade-off.
Device-to-Device Communication Performance
Connection establishment. While a TLS connection takes around 19ms to be established, a device association using anchor takes less than 0.06ms. This means that anchor can easily support large-scale data centers (e.g., 1k switches and 100k hosts [5, 15, 48] ) while being orders of magnitude more efficient than traditional solutions for this particular metric. The scale of the improvement of our connection setup process when compared to the TLS handshake is due to three main factors. First, our algorithm has half the number of steps. Second, we use symmetric cryptography only. Third, we use the fast ciphering provided by NaCl.
Communications overhead. Figure 3(b) shows the results of control plane communications using OpenSSL, TCP, and two versions of ANCHOR. For communication of up to 128 forwarding devices, sending 10k control messages each, our solution requires (while offering stronger security guarantees-see below) only half of the resources and time of an OpenSSL-based implementation using AES256-SHA, the most widely available cipher suite.
In Figure 3 (b), we can also observe the overhead of confidentiality (TCP-ANCHOR-EMAC). In contrast to providing only authenticity and integrity (TCP-ANCHOR-MAC), confidentiality incurs an overhead of around 15%.
It is worth emphasizing that we achieved these results by also ensuring much stronger security, as we generated one secret key per packet. On the other hand, the OpenSSL-based implementation used a single key (for the symmetric ciphering) for the entire communication session.
Attack Prevention
A type of attack that is recurrently presented as an important security threat in the context of SDN is the introduction by an attacker of rogue switches in the network (see [10, 32, 34, 58, 70, 76] ). A set of switches under control of an attacker can be used for a distributed denial-ofservice (DDoS) attack, for instance, negatively affecting SDN control. We use this type of attack as an example use case that shows the logical centralization of security services in anchor to enable attack prevention. The defence against this type of attack consists of a switch having to register itself to anchor before being able to associate with the controller. If either the registration or association process fails, the switch connection with the controller is automatically dropped.
To demonstrate this functionality, we set up an experiment using the second version of our system (the one with OVS and Ryu as the data and control planes, respectively). We emulated a small network with Mininet, comprised of five switches (s0-s4) and five hosts (h0-h4), following a tree topology with s0 at the root. Each network host is connected to one switch (e.g., host h4 is connected to switch s4). To emulate the attack, we assumed s2 to be a rogue device introduced to the network by an attacker. As the network manager has not registered s2 into the system, this switch should not be able to associate itself with the controller. As a result, host h2 should not be reachable by any other host and vice-versa.
The outcome of the experiment was as follows. Once the Mininet network was up and running, we ran the pingall command to verify the reachability of all hosts. We observed an overall packet loss of 40% -the result of 1 out of 5 unreachable hosts (h2, in this case). Each host executes a reachability test for all other four hosts. However, the reachability test for host h2 fails. In the case of h2, all reachability tests fail. In a closer inspection, we verified that while the simulation was running, switch s2 periodically tried to associate itself with Ryu, without success, as expected.
Traditional Solutions versus ANCHOR
In Table 3 , we provide a summarised comparison between a traditional solution and our anchor. As traditional solutions we considered the EJBCA (http://www.ejbca.org/) and OpenSSL, two popular implementations of PKI and TLS, respectively. As we have shown before, our bootstrap process (device registration and association) is much faster and our connection latency is also significantly lower. In addition, our solution has nearly one order of magnitude less LOCs and uses four times fewer external libraries. This makes a difference from a resilience perspective. For instance, to formally prove more than 717k LOCs (EJBCA + OpenSSL) is by itself a tremendous challenge. Moreover, it gets considerably worse if we take into account 80 external libraries and 11 programming languages.
Our proposed architecture offers a functionally equivalent level of security with respect to properties such as authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality when compared to traditional alternatives. Additionally, anchor offers a higher level of security by providing PCS and PQS. While the former is ensured through post-compromise recovery (see Section 4.9), the latter is a consequence of using only symmetric cryptography. Further, the lightweight nature of our mechanisms, such as the iDVV, make them amenable to be used on a per message basis to secure communication, increasing cryptographic robustness. Moreover, by having fewer LOCs, we significantly reduce the threat surface. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the PFS (*) of traditional solutions, such as those provided by the different implementations of TLS, is not easy or simple to enforce. First, in spite of TLS providing ciphers that offer PFS, in practice, different cipher suites do not feature it [113] . This means that not all implementations and deployments of TLS offer PFS or provide it with a very low encryption grade [39, 55, 86] . To give an example, widely deployed web servers, such as Apache and Nginx [39] and most DHE-and ECDHE-enabled servers, suffer from weak PFS configurations [2, 55, 117] .
RELATED WORK ON SDN SECURITY
Related work on SDN security (see [37, 69, 110, 130] for broad surveys) focuses on securing specific components of the architecture. As many attacks exploit vulnerabilities of the control plane, the security of the controller and the applications running on top of it have deserved attention. In a nutshell, solutions such as SANE [31] , Ethane [30] , FortNOX [99] , SE-Floodlight [100] , FRESCO [114] , and FLOWGUARD [54] are specialized applications that run on top of (or as) controllers. The main goal of such solutions is to provide some security enforcement in the data plane through security services that run on the control plane. For instance, FLOWGUARD [54] allows users to build robust firewalls by means of a comprehensive framework to protect OpenFlow-based networks. Those firewalls generate OpenFlow flow rules to be installed in forwarding devices, protecting devices and network services against different security threats. As another example, the controller Rosemary [115] implements a network application containment and resilience strategy that addresses the problem of malicious applications leading to loss of network control. Similarly, Fort-NOX [99] , a software extension for the NOX controller, is robust to adversarial applications by providing role-based authorization and security constraint enforcement.
These works address different security issues, and they all focus on the functional aspects: that is, on installing the appropriate OpenFlow rules in the data plane to achieve their goals. In contrast, we propose the logical centralization of non-functional properties, with focus on infrastructure security in this article. As such, anchor should be seen as (i) complementary to these solutions; and (ii) in fact, providing overarching properties which can, amongst other things, assist in the robust implementation of some of the proposed services. For instance, Rosemary requires a PKI infrastructure for application authorisation that could be replaced by anchor, inheriting its advantages.
Another line of work in SDN security is devoted to DoS/DDoS attack detection and prevention. As an example, the use of lightweight information hiding-based authentication (by means of secrecy through obscurity) has been proposed as one way of protecting SDN controllers from this type of attack [1] . The idea is to use a specific field in the IP protocol to hide the switch authentication ID. In order for the scheme to be workable, it is assumed that a look-up table and unique IDs are shared among devices through existing key distribution protocols. Again, this point solution could take advantage of anchor for this purpose.
Interestingly, not much attention has been paid to the security of control plane associations and communication between devices, one of the aspects that we address in this article. While TLS is the solution recommended by ONF, recent research discusses the strengths and weaknesses of this protocol as a means to provide authenticated and encrypted control channels [107] , which is aligned with many of the arguments that we make here. As we explained, while the use of TLS gives important security properties, it has an impact on control plane performance. Additionally, the complexity of the infrastructure software has been recurrently pointed out as one of the main causes for a high number of reported vulnerabilities that, in many cases, have led to security attacks [53, 81, 82, 137] . As we argue in this article, by logically centralizing crucial security mechanisms, anchor removes complexity from both controllers and switches, enhancing the robustness of the infrastructure and still achieving a gain in performance.
Finally, to protect control plane communications between controllers and forwarding devices, our solution makes use of two existing mechanisms: iDVV [71, 72] , as a secure and low-cost method for generation of authentication codes, and NaCl [18] , as a robust alternative to OpenSSL. We apply these solutions to SDN but, given their stand-alone nature, they can be applied to different scenarios.
To our knowledge, an architectural approach such as the one that we propose here (which ultimately led to following the SDN philosophy of "logical centralization") was lacking. Importantly, this approach allowed us to gain a global perspective of the relevant gaps in SDN and the limitations of existing solutions to the problem. This first step gave insight into one of the most relevant problems of SDN (as noted by the ONF or MEF security groups [83, 90] ): the security of the associations and communications between devices -which, jointly with the architecture itself, is one of the contributions of our article.
DISCUSSION
We briefly discuss how we filled the gaps identified in Section 3. Incidentally, we also show, in Appendix E of [73] , to which extent these solutions cover 11 of ONF's security requirements. We conclude the section with a critique of our choices and results.
Meeting the Challenges
Security vs performance? Control channels need to provide high performance (high throughput and low latency) while keeping communication secure. However, as it has been shown, security primitives have a non-negligible impact on performance. To mitigate this problem, we selected appropriate cryptographic primitives (SHA512), libraries (NaCl), and key generation mechanisms (iDVV) to ensure the security of control plane communications maintaining high performance. By logically centralizing the fundamental aspects of these mechanisms in anchor, the performance overhead introduced in forwarding devices and controllers is limited, as they require only minimal functionality to 'hook' to the anchor instructions.
Complexity vs robustness? Traditional implementations of SSL/TLS, such as OpenSSL, have a large, complex code base that recurrently leads to vulnerabilities being discovered. Similar problems are observed in PKI subsystems. It is well known that an effective means to achieve robustness is by reducing complexity. Hence, our choice for the NaCl and iDVV mechanisms to help fill the gap, since they are lightweight (small code base), efficient, yet secure alternatives to OpenSSL-like implementations. As such, they are a robust solution to provide authentication and authorisation material for the secure communications protocols that we propose. They are also amenable to verification mechanisms aimed to ensure correctness, which are much harder to employ in very large code bases. Again, the centralization of the non-functional mechanisms introduced in our solution is the key to reducing complexity of networking devices, improving their robustness.
Global security policies? We have argued that controllers and network devices often employ suboptimal network authentication and secure communication mechanisms, despite recommendations from ONF and other such organizations for the opposite. This problem is very similar in nature to the state of affairs in networking before SDN. In traditional networks, enforcing relatively "simple" policies such as access control rules [30] or traffic engineering mechanisms [57] was either very hard or even impossible in practice. Given the current undesirable state of affairs, we believe the same to be true for non-functional properties, with security as a prominent example. Our logically centralized anchor architecture addresses this gap by providing a means for making centralized policy rules and the necessary mechanisms to enforce them, permeating the SDN architecture in a global and coherent way.
Resilient roots-of-trust? We debated that there is a (probably reduced) number of functions which should not be left to ad-hoc implementations owing to their criticality on system correctness. The list is not closed, but we hope to have shown that strong sources of entropy and resilient indistinguishable-from-random number generators are clear examples of difficult-to-getright mechanisms that benefit from this logically centralized approach. anchor addresses this issue by providing the motivation to design and verify careful and resilient once-and-for-all implementations of such root-of-trust mechanisms, which can then be reinstantiated in different SDN deployments.
Devil's Advocate Analysis Doesn't the logical centralization of non-functional properties create a single point of failure?
The results of this article already go a long way to improving robustness of a single root-of-trust compared with the state of the art: lowering failure probability and mitigating and recovering from the consequences of failure. The logical next step would be to try and prevent failures in the first place. However, the failure of a simplex system of reasonable complexity cannot be prevented.
Nevertheless, note that logical centralization is not necessarily physical centralization. Our plan for future work (and the way that we drafted our architecture paved the way) is to leverage state-of-the-art security and dependability mechanisms using replication. For instance, to achieve tolerance of Byzantine faults, we can readily enhance anchor by replication, taking advantage of state machine replication libraries such as BFT-SMaRt [21] , replicating and diversifying components to prevent failure of this logically central point, with the desired confidence. These concepts have been applied to root-of-trust like configurations similar to anchor [29, 67, 136] . Furthermore, systems designed with state machine replication in mind can also handle different types of threats, such as DoS, without compromising the operation of the service [68] .
Won't the natural hardware evolution be by itself enough to reduce the penalty imposed by cryptographic primitives? Recent reality seems to contradict this assertion -hardware evolution does not seem to be enough for several reasons. First, new hardware architectures can benefit different existing software-based solutions. For instance, both NaCl and OpenSSL take advantage of hardware-based AES accelerators. Second, as is well known, the fixed price of advancements in hardware seems to be coming to an end [56] . This is made clear by most of the major IT companies, such as Google and Microsoft, redesigning existing software as a response to cope with this problem [78] .
Aren't traditional PKI and TLS implementations enough?
Following what is becoming recurrently advocated by many in the industry and in the security community, we have tried to argue that the simplicity and size of software and IT infrastructure matters [35, 122] . Higher complexity has been shown to lead inevitably to an increased likelihood of bugs and security incidents in software. Indeed, different implementations of PKI and TLS have been recently used as powerful "weapons" for cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage [25, 101] , leading to concerns about their robustness. Contrary to what this argument may suggest, that does not mean that PKI and TLS are "broken". We believe they remain fundamental to various IT infrastructures. However, as the main challenges of securing SDN are usually relatively constrained to within a network domain, we have come to understand that simpler, domain-specific solutions seem to be preferable in this environment when compared to complex infrastructures such as PKI, and large code bases such as OpenSSL.
Wouldn't the use of out-of-band control channels solve most problems? Out-of-band channels may be useful in some contexts, but they are not "intrinsically" secure. It is a recurrent mistake to consider physical isolation, per se, as a form of security. Several studies have argued the opposite: that out-of-band channels worsen the problem by making control plane management more complex and less flexible, endangering control plane communications [41, 80] . We do not take a stance in this debate, but the fact is that real incidents, such as NSA sniffing of Google's cables between data centers [109] , seem to be clear examples that out-of-band channels are not, per se, enough.
Other Use Cases of ANCHOR
Using anchor beyond control plane communications. As already alluded to in Section 8, anchor can be extended to support other use cases. For instance, one application running on top of the SDN controller could be required to provide proper credentials to identify itself. Once successfully authenticated, it should have access to a specific set of system attributes defined by the operator during registration (e.g., read, write, notify, among other system calls [7, 44] ). Towards this goal, different controllers could rely on authentication and authorization attributes globally enforced by anchor. Another interesting use case for anchor would be to offer security support for controller clustering. This is a timely problem. To give an example, the current release of OpenDaylight does not provide encryption or authentication of control messages exchanged among controller instances [91] . Since each controller instance would need to be registered with anchor, it would be possible to provide the same security mechanisms and services that we grant to the southbound connection to ensure security in east-west communication between controllers.
Addressing other non-functional properties of SDN. The design of anchor is generic enough to accommodate non-functional properties beyond security, such as dependability or QoS. With respect to the former, anchor could help in modularising the problem of replicated control. Specifically, anchor could be responsible for coordination between controller replicas, for instance, by guaranteeing a strongly consistent view of the network across all instances. Similar to our security use case, the additional modularity of such a design would allow a clean separation of concerns that could simplify the design of the various components. Recent proposals [26] have started following a similar design choice. anchor could also provide trusted measurement services for ensuring a certain level of service even in the presence of malicious forwarding devices. For instance, once a malicious forwarding device were detected [33, 58] , anchor could automatically remove it from the list of legitimate devices, forcing the disconnection of those devices by the controllers of the network, which would be registered to receive such events. The subsequent topology updates on the controllers would trigger automatic traffic re-routing to ensure the quality of service of applications.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we debated the problem of enforcing non-functional properties in SDN, such as security or dependability. Reiterating the successful philosophy behind the inception of SDN itself, we advocate the concept of logical centralization of SDN non-functional properties provision, which we materialize in terms of the blueprint of an architectural framework, anchor.
Taking 'security' as a proof-of-concept use case, we have shown the effectiveness of our proposal. We made a gap analysis of security in SDN and proposed solutions by populating the anchor middleware with crucial mechanisms and services to fill those gaps and enhance the security of SDN.
We evaluated the architecture, especially focusing on the security/performance analysis tradeoff, giving proofs of the algorithms, cryptographic robustness analyses, and experimental performance evaluations. By resorting to lightweight yet secure primitives, we outperform the most widely used encryption of OpenSSL by 50%, with a higher level of security. Our solution also fulfils 11 of the security requirements recommended by ONF.
The mechanisms that we propose are certainly not the final answer to SDN security problems. That is not our claim. However, we believe and hope to have justified in the article that an architecture that logically centralizes non-functional properties of an SDN has the potential to address some of the most preeminent unsolved problems regarding the robustness of the infrastructure. We thus hope that our work will trigger an important discussion on these fundamental architectural aspects of SDN.
